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Abstract

The civil wars that have occurred in Africa have had destabilizing effects on the
political and social structure of African countries .The massacres and genocide of
1993 and 1994 in Rwanda and Burundi shocked the whole world into
experiencing the horror of the news that more than one million people had been
slaughtered in cold blood. The causes of the conflict in Rwanda and Burundi are
many and complex. In this paper, my major focus will be on the role the armed
forces have played in the conflict and how demilitarization should be the
alternative solution in bringing permanent peace to the war torn region.
I have used a demilitarization model created by African delegates in an effort to
bring about sustainable peace in the African region. The main components of the
model include, building consensus, redefining the role of the military, improving
civil military relations and analyzing the role that external actors have played.
My findings indicate that the demilitarization process has not been a success in
both Rwanda and Burundi because despite the signing of numerous peace
accords the resolutions of the accords have not been fully achieved. The
demilitarization of rebel groups has been partially implemented.
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Introduction
"Peace", admittedly is often a rare commodity in the world, more so in Africa and
the third world in general. The massacres and genocide of 1993 and 1994 in
Rwanda and Burundi shocked the whole world into experiencing the horror of the
news that more than one million people had been slaughtered in cold blood.
The causes of the conflict in Rwanda and Burundi are many and complex.
In this paper, my major focus will be on the role armed forces have played in the
conflict and how demilitarization should be the alternative solution in bringing
permanent peace to the war torn region. I will also trace and examine the
sources and causes for the escalation of violence in these countries with special
attention to the role of the army, its nature and relationship with the people and
civil government. I shall also examine the barriers to the road to peace.
The demilitarization process will look at how the military is transformed
into an institution that is governed by the civilian government, a government
constituted by the majority of the people. The main concepts that will be
addressed include the demobilization of the rebel groups and government army,
the cease-fire agreements, the transformation of the military regimes into civilian
government and the integration of the army into society. My research is going to
be a follow up on the demilitarization process that has occurred in Rwanda and
Burundi. My analysis will be based on the time period starting from1993 to 2003.
This timeframe will cover the beginning of the genocide, the establishment of
peace accords and the new transitional governments. I have chosen to focus on
the demilitarization process because if effectively implemented, it has the
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potential of bringing regional stability. In my research I will focus on the efforts
that the government of Burundi and Rwanda have taken towards building
consensus between opposing groups, redefining the role of the military and
actions that have been taken to improve civil-military relations. I will also look at
the role external players have played in the demilitarization process.
I have chosen to focus on Rwanda and Burundi primarily because its civil
wars have caused economic and political instability in the entire Great Lake 1
regions. An estimated 1,000,000 people, mainly civilians, have been killed in the
nine-year civil war that has occurred in Rwanda and Burundi. The year 2003
stands as a significant point in time because it marks the transitional phase in the
Burundian and Rwandan governments. The demilitarization process will be
tested to its fullest as the second phase of the peace accords becomes a reality.
The success of the transitional power sharing process will determine whether
demilitarization has been a success or whether it has failed to live up to its goals.
According to the 2000 "peace accord" signed by the rebels in Burundi, the Tutsi
President Buyoya stepped down in May 2003 to allow President Domitian
Ndayizeye to take over. In Rwanda, the peace accord has stated that the present
transitional government under Kagame will allow for elections to occur in August
2003.
Much has been written on the demilitarization process in Rwanda and
Burundi. However, not much research has been done on the practicality or
applicability of the demilitarization resolutions that were agreed upon at the
Arusha Conference. The focus of the Arusha Conference was the need to bring
1 The

Great Lakes constitute of Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Democratic Republic of Congo
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about sustainable regional stability within Africa. Demilitarization was the main
focus; the leaders came up with a demilitarization model that would hopefully be
applicable to the social and political climate that exists in Africa. I shall use this
model in the analysis and evaluation of my findings.
My research indicates that the demilitarization process in Rwanda and
Burundi has been met with challenges. Despite the numerous peace accords that
have been signed in both countries, the resolutions of the accords have not been
fully implemented and to date, the demilitarization process has not been
completely achieved. The demobilization of rebel groups has been partially
implemented in the above states, because a few dissident groups are still
operating from neighboring states as guerrillas thus the security issues still
remain a grave concern for the governments. The civil wars that have occurred in
Rwanda and Burundi suggest an urgent need to come up with effective and longterm conflict resolution programs that have the prospects of bringing sustainable
peace to the war torn nations.

3

A Brief Narrative of the Nature of Conflict in Rwanda and Burundi

One of the main challenges in conflict resolution is trying to understand the
nature of the conflict within a country. The actual triggers of violence and hostility
in Burundi and Rwanda have proven to be complex. In the past the international
community has focused on ethnic rivalry as the major root cause of conflict.
Further research has however shown that the conflicts in the region are not just
ethnic. The root causes can be divided into categories of colonial experience,
ethnic rivalry and political power.
Rivalries between the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi were
present before the colonial period but however were enhanced by the colonial
experience. The Belgians and Catholic missionaries played a major role in
enhancing ethnic cleavages within the region. The colonists brought to Burundi
and Rwanda a cultural bias that elevated the Tutsis at the expense of the Hutus.
The Europeans favored the Tutsis in education and administration. Following the
recommendation of Catholic bishops, most Hutu chiefs were replaced by Tutsis
in the 1930's. The schools were attended by 79% Tutsis and 21 % Hutus. The
Tutsis began to believe they were racially superior to the Hutus and were more
intelligent and capable of leadership.

2

Through a policy of divide and rule, the colonial authorities deliberately
exacerbated ethnic cleavages. According to Bishop Class, the Tutsis are "born
to rule and they have a sense of leadership. It is the secret of their settlement in
the country and of their control over it." The Tutsi also learned from the
2 Mevin Ndarusigiye, Marie Mayoya: Burundi: When the Pie is Too Small, (National Library: Amman
Jordon, 2000.) pp.4-5
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Europeans how to solve their problems by using force. The colonies depended
on forced labor, so the Tutsi subjected the Hutu peasantry into forced labor and
took away their land.

3

In Rwanda, the first Hutu revolution occurred in 1959, when the Hutu
majority overthrew the ruling Tutsi monarch, killing hundreds of Tutsis and driving
tens of thousands into exile in neighboring countries. However the tables turned
in 1990 when Tutsi exiles from the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) who were
living in Uganda, returned back to claim their rights to actively participate in
government. The civil war in Rwanda has claimed the lives of roughly 800,000
Tutsi's. In July 1994, the Tutsi rebels defeated the Hutu regime; causing at least
2 million Hutu's to flee from their country in fear of Tutsi retribution. Today the
RPF is the major player in the government.
The political instability in Burundi started as far back as 1966. King
Mwambutsa was dethroned by his son Prince Ntare, who was later removed from
office by a military coup lead by Michel Micombero. Civil unrest continued
throughout the late 1960's and early 1980's. Increased tension during 1988,
resulted in violent confrontation between the ruling Tutsi and the majority Hutu's
(Ndarusigiye 57). The most violent coup occurred in 1991 when Major Pierre
Buyoya overthrew Colonel Bagaza. Buyoya suspended the constitution and
dissolved opposition parties. During this period an estimated 300,000 civilians
were killed.

3

Mevin Ndarusigiye, Marie Mayoya: Burundi: When the Pie is Too Small, (National Library: Amman
Jordon, 2000.)
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The social injustice that existed towards the Hutu initiated the struggle for
their survival. The Hutu had been largely excluded from political, economical and
social life. The Tutsis, though they were the minority, occupied more land than
the majority Hutu's. The exclusion policy that the Tutsi adopted in their
governance brought great tension between the two groups. The monopolization
of power in the hands of the Tutsi constituted a crucial and undisputed factor in
establishing the ethnic cleavage that would later lead to genocide.

6

Chapter 1 : Literature Review

Demilitarization Process
The study of demilitarization and its impact seems to be a relatively new
and relevant topic for political science. The topic of demilitarization is of
relevance to Africa because the African continent has been characterized by
military coups in almost two thirds of its states which gained independence after
colonial rule. Most of the governments in Africa have been established through
revolutionary methods hence in the beginning governments are often run by
former rebel leaders who, with time, may go through a transition to establish
democratic state.
Most research in this area has been in the form of case studies, which
have taken a close look at how the demobilization process has been
implemented in countries such as Mozambique, Angola and South Africa.
Authors such as Guy Lamb have defined demobilization as a process by which
the armed forces, both the government and opposition downsize. Lamb's
research indicates that the demilitarization process is not a static phenomenon.
The author argues that the process is usually complex and multidimensional and
in most cases is shaped by historical and social contexts. The author has
concluded that the process of demilitarization can only be successful when
certain internal and external factors exist. The internal factors pointed out include
the political will to envisage and implement demilitarization policies and the public
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support for such endeavors. The external enabling environment includes the
existence of good relations between neighboring countries.

4

The civil wars that have occurred in Rwanda and Burundi have attracted
considerable attention from the international media and scholars interested in the
preventative and conflict management areas. The interest in these two countries
suggest an urgent need to come up with effective and long-term conflict
resolution programs that understand the root causes of conflict in the Great Lake
Regions.
In the past, scholars have felt that little research had been done to indicate
the impact of demobilization and the risks that are involved in the implementation
process. Kees Kingma takes a close look at the demobilization process in
Uganda by focusing on the nature of the conflict concentrating on the key players
within the Uganda's demilitarization process. The demilitarization of Uganda
included the demobilization of government and non-governmental troops. The
reforms included the implementation of programs that catered to the needs of
armed troops. Ex-soldiers and their families went through pre-discharge
briefings, which provided them with details on how to establish civilian life by
teaching them basic skills such as opening bank accounts and giving them legal
advice. Kigma's argument is that if the veterans are not integrated into the
society, the possibilities for the armed forces rearming increases.

5

Some of the lessons learned from the demobilization process in
Mozambique and Lesotho include the need to have an efficient demobilization
4

Guy Lamb, "Reflections on Demilitarization: A Southern African Perspective" International
Peacekeeping. Vol. 7, No3, Autumn 2000. pp. 120-124.
5 Kees Kingma, Demobilization in the sub Sahara Africa (New York NY: St Martin's Inc 2000) pp. 34-89
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plan that takes into consideration the timeline that the facilitators give themselves
between assembling the troops and the initial demobilization time frame. In the
case of Mozambique the process almost came to a stand still because the troops
felt that the demobilization process went too slow and they were becoming
anxious to go back to their normal civilian lives. This case study appears to show
that the success of the demilitarization process lays in the troops themselves. 6
According to Richard Synge, the demobilization of Mozambique was
difficult to initiate and hard to sustain because of the lack of trust between the
Renamo and Frelimo parties. Both parties looked suspiciously towards each
other and were quick to retreat from their commitment. The author takes a close
look at the initial stage in the demobilization process. The initial stage was the
assembly of all the men who had been in the army. The process involved the
collecting of armaments. However the weapons brought in were generally old
and in poor conditions. It is estimated that ninety percent of the weapons handed
in were unserviceable. The author states that the demobilization was half hearted
because both the warring parties failed to discharge their troops. (Synge 109)
The demilitarization process in Mozambique had numerous problems. The
facilitators of the conflict resolution process found it hard to recruit volunteers
from the new· army because most of the soldiers were suspicious of the
conditions of co-operation. There were also major problems in the accounting of

6

Richard Synge, Mozambique UN Peacekeeping in Action 1992-94 (Washington D.C: Institute of Peace
Press 1997) pp. 100-106
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the armed forces. This made it difficult for the international agency to come up
with an appropriate estimate of the cost of ex-combatant integration process. 7
Some of the lessons learned from the demobilization process in
Mozambique include the need to have an efficient demobilization plan that takes
into consideration the timeline that the facilitators gave themselves between
assembling the troops and the initial demobilization. In Mozambique, the
demilitarization pressure was coming from the soldiers who wanted to demobilize
before the elections.
Zimbabwe's demobilization process was a success initially because the
nature of the cease-fire was spelt out clearly. The freedom fighters were to go
into assembly points across the country with the intention that some of them
would be integrated into the main army. However Zimbabwe's case involved an
effort to reduce the size of the integrated army. The integration of the army
began soon after independence in 1980. The process involved the provision of
education for ex-combatants and their families, the provisions of formal
employment and business ventures such as the formation of the Zimbabwe
Broadcast Corporation (ZBC) that was established to allow the participation of
ex-combatants in the economy, seven ex-combatants owned the corporation.
Though the demobilization process has been successful for the most part in
Zimbabwe, there has always been a fear among the civilian that the war veterans
would re-arm themselves. 8

7

Richard Synge, Mozambique UN Peacekeeping in Action 1992-94 (Washington D.C: Institute of Peace
Press 1997) pp.109
8 Moving the People from Conflict to Peace in Eastern and Southern Africa. (EDICESA Harare 1998) pp.
30-67.
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Guy Lamb has done a critical review of the demilitarization trends in
Southern Africa. He has primarily focused on the demobilization process in South
Africa. The demilitarization process in South Africa has been unique primarily
because it involved the reform of the police. Lamb argues that reductions in
military spending and downsizing of the armed forces are not always reliable
indicators of demilitarization in southern Africa because some of the highly
militarized countries such as Angola reduced their military spending even during
their civil wars while a country such as Swaziland, which has not been prone to
any civil unrest, increased its military spending. 9
Lamb also states that primary function of the demilitarization process
should be the disarmament of troops. Disarmament can come in the form of a
dramatic decrease of military spending. It can also involve the reduction in the
number of military personnel or limitation on arms transfer. He views that
militarism and militarization provide great insight on demilitarization. These
definitions provide the conceptual basis for the analysis of the demilitarization
trends in the Southern African region. The militarism of a state is indicated by the
way the society validates military power and the preparation of war. He defines
militarization as the dynamic relationship between military and society; this
environment encourages military coups and authoritarian regimes.

9

Guy Lamb, Reflection on Demilitarization: A Southern African Perspective. (International Peace-keeping
Vol 7 Autumn 2000)
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Civil-Military Relations
The literature on civil-military relations will primarily be focused on civil-military
relations in Africa during government transition. Most analysis on Civil-military
relations in Africa has been based on a conflict resolution context. Scholars such
as Robert Griffiths have focused on understanding the armed force not as an
institution that stands outside its society but as an integral part of society. The
authors take a close look at military rule and military order by focusing on the
broader issues that define the relationship between civilians and military. The
author examines this relationship by focusing on the shifting nature of these
relations. 10
Literature studying Civil-Military relations has, in most part, focused on the
armed forces institutional characteristics and their political role in society. The
characteristic of the armed force and its interest still is significant in analyzing the
transitions in civil-military relations. This analysis takes a close look at those
societies that are coming from authoritarian rule and focuses on some of the
problems that are associated in institutional reform. Some of the problems faced
by the governments, who are working towards healthy civil-military relation,
include making the armed forces more representative towards the ethnicity of the
country ensuring their political neutrality and bringing the armed forces under
civilian control. The obstacles and solution to these problems highlight the
complexity of democratic reform and the demilitarization process. Griffiths has
seen the beginning of a new pattern in the civil-military relations, which is
10 Griffiths, Robert I.SOUTH AFRICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TRANSITION: ISSUES AND
INFLUENCES, Armed Forces & Society, 0095327X, Spring95, Vol. 21, Issue 3
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influenced by variables that involve both the armed forces and civil society. The
variables include the past pattern of civil-military relations, threats to the armed
forces institutional interest, ethnic fragmentation and the impact of military
restructuring on reconstruction and development process. The author states that
the military has both the power and incentive to influence restructuring issues.
According to the author no military can be apolitical. 11
Conflict Resolution
Most of the literature on conflict resolution in Africa has been in the form of
conflict prevention, which generally involves the building of political and social
structures that help facilitate equal participation of both civilian and military in
politics. Preventative diplomacy strives whenever possible to avert to costs of
human suffering that conflict usually causes.

12

Researchers such as Donald Rothschild have advocated for more military
transparency, which usually involves making military expenditure be accessible
to the population and the government. In this context most researchers have
advocated for laws that oppose international loans to any country that fails to
carry out a transparent civilian audit of their military spending. Rothschild argues
that downsizing the military will reduce opportunities for military to engage in
political manipulation. Rothschild focuses on understanding the armed forces not
as an institution that stands outside its society but as an integral part of society.
The author takes a close look at the impact of the military size, structure and its

11 Griffiths Robert "DEMOCRATISATION AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NAMIBIA,
SOUTH AFRICA AND MOZAMBIQUE" Third World Quarterly (Sep 1996)Vol. 17, Issue 3.
12 William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York, New York:
Oxford University Press 1985) pp 4-6
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values upon a society. Donald argues that ethnic conflicts that have occurred in
Africa are not inevitable and can be managed. He puts more responsibility on
leaders whom he indicates can prevent harmful relations from arising. He
advocates that governments should give incentives that channel the rebel
group's choice along the preferred lines. The parties involved in establishing
effective conflict management systems in Africa must examine the role of the
state in defining and negotiating the terms of its relationship with various ethnic
groups.

13

Studies done by William Zartman are concerned with local sources of
conflict in the Third World. The main objective of his studies is to show that such
conflicts that pose a threat to the international stability, find their origins in the
political relations of the countries involved and not from external powers such as
past colonizers. Zartman emphasizes the importance of building up trust between
the warring parties. He states that parties must be brought to a better
understanding of the motives behind the peace agreements and what's at stake
for them if they do not work towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict. 14
Critics who have examined the origins of conflict in Africa, primarily West
African countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, point out that personalized
autocratic rule that exists in most of these countries has been the main trigger for
wars. The irony in most of these countries is that those that challenged the
regimes through coups did not change the structure of the government thus they

13

Donald Rothschild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa, (Washington DC: Brooking Institution Press
2000)pp19-22
.
14 William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York, New York:
Oxford University Press) p. 274
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failed to offer a new alternative that would facilitate for the implementation of
democracy and the facilitation of peace. 15 The above-mentioned researchers
view conflict resolution as only the beginning and not the end to Africa's
problems.
Summary of Literature Review

The literature reviewed above, indicates that there are some essential tools that
help facilitate successful demobilization of a country. One essential theme is the
concept of setting a right time for the demilitarization process to take place. This
appears essential when determining the success of the conflict resolution
method. The literature also suggests that those who are involved in the
demilitarization process should avoid raising expectations beyond realistic levels.
Knowing the real needs and concerns of ex-combatants beforehand makes the
design of the program intervention more appropriate. All authors agree that the
demilitarization process is very expensive and thus there is a need for the parties
involved to be fully committed to the process.
The case studies show that demobilization of the armed forces is a slow
and dangerous process. Results are ambiguous in the beginning of the process.
One of the common challenges in the demobilization of the armed forces has
been lack of reliable information about the number of troops that need to be
demobilized. Another obstacle has been related to the ambiguity of the conflicts.
This becomes an obstacle because most of the conflict resolution specialists can
not find the root causes of the conflict.

15

Rupensighe Civil Wars Civil Peace pp138
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In summary, demilitarization has been examined from many different
perspectives but no recent work has examined the progress of the
demilitarization process in Rwanda and Burundi. No one has questioned the
necessity of the demilitarization process in these two states. This paper will focus
on the successes or failures of the demilitarization by examining the process in
Rwanda and Burundi.

16

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework: Arusha Model
In the analysis of the demilitarization process and the evaluation of my findings, I
have chosen to apply the demilitarization model designed at the Arusha
Conference in 1994, "The Leadership Challenges of Demilitarization in Africa
conference"16 sponsored by the World Bank and the United Nations. I chose this
particular model firstly because it was created on the bases of past
demilitarization experiences that have occurred in other parts of the world,
particularly Latin America. The participants of the conference were able to take a
comparative look at the demilitarization processes of the past and modify their
findings to create a demilitarization model that could be applied to the African
region. Demilitarization was the main focus; the leaders came up with a
demilitarization model that would hopefully be applicable to the social and
political climate that exists in Africa. I will use this model for the analysis and
evaluation of my findings. Secondly, the main architects of this model are from
Africa. Thus, the model avoids the notion of being western based. It has an
"African perspective".

17

The theoretical framework used for the research was created by
representatives of twenty seven African countries including Rwanda and Burundi.
The results of the conference highlight demilitarization as a process essential to
the establishment of a more democratic civil-military relation in Africa. The time

16 The leadership Challenges of Demilitarization was held in Arusha Tanzania in July 22-24 in 1998. One
hundred and twenty seven countries gathered to discuss the political, social and economic ramification of
demilitarization. Countries attending include Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa,
Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Ghana, and Lesotho.
17 The African perspective implies that the model notes that there are cultural, social and economic
differences within African conflicts and therefore there is need for adjustments.
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frame of 1993 -1994 is significant to this research because it gives an insight to
the root causes and the nature of the conflict in the two countries. The period
1995-2003 is significant because it marks the road map to peace, which
highlights the steps that the governments have taken in their demilitarization
process. These steps include the participation in cease-fires, the demobilization
and integration of the armed forces and transformation of the military.
The research method I have chosen is a comparative case study of two
countries. This method will allow me to make a critical analysis of the
demilitarization process in the two countries and see if in fact the process has
been a success or a failure. The model has highlighted that demilitarization is
essential to the establishment of more democratic governance in Africa. The
model deserves examination because if it is applied successfully in Burundi and
Rwanda other countries in the Great Lake regions might follow, but if the model
fails to yield any positive results then re-evaluation of the demilitarization process
may need to be made.
There are several factors that make these two case studies appropriate in
contributing to the comparative perspective. Firstly, both countries share a
common ethnic background; Rwanda and Burundi have the same ethnic
composition with almost the same proportion. Secondly, both countries were
protectorates of Belgium tor similar length of time. Thirdly, both countries have
experienced transformation from military regime to civilian rule. The causes of
the conflict in both countries are similar. The root causes in both countries can be
characterized by arbitrary colonial boundaries, the disparity in the distribution of
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national resources, struggle for political power and the ethnic based violence.
Both countries have gone through tragic civil wars that have contributed to great
human suffering. Finally, the two countries share a common boarder hence
instability in either country is most likely to have ripple effects in the other. In both
cases the cycle of violence has repeated itself within two generations. The
implementation of the demilitarization strategies involves coming up with
concrete and practical principles that would lead to sustainable change in the
civil-military relations in Africa. The framework consists of a sequence of steps
that countries can follow when implementing the demilitarization process.
Rwanda and Burundi have undergone similar demilitarization process that
has yielded different results. Despite the numerous peace accords that have
been signed in both countries, the demilitarization process has not yet been fully
implemented. However the results of the model when applied to Burundi and
Rwanda indicate that there are some concepts that are included in the model that
are difficult to establish. Building consensus and redefining the role of the military
has been a challenge since both countries suffer from lack of trust. The parties
involved were not fully committed to the peace process. They came to the
negotiating table to give lip service and never implemented the agreements. The
most successful aspect of the Arusha model has been to illustrate the role that
external factors have played in facilitating a peaceful transition to the democratic
process in Burundi. All steps included in Arusha model are essential in
demilitarization process however the first stage of Building Consensus is the
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most crucial and essential if there is to be a sustainable and successful
demilitarization process.

20

Theoretical Framework
1. Building Consensus
According to the delegation at the conference it is essential to build a level of
political consensus between the parties involved. Extensive dialogue must be
held on the national, sub-regional and regional levels.
2. Redefine the role of military in society
The military should be integrated in the society and not be isolated from the
decision making process in order to ensure the sustainability of the
demilitarization process.
3. Improve civil-military relations
Networking and dialogue between military representatives and civil society
should be encouraged. Adequate civilian supervision over the military should be
given. Accountability and transparency measures should be established. A
Parliament should be established to act as a check and balance to the armed
forces. The composition of the new-armed force must reflect the ethnic, tribal and
regional composition of the population.
4. The role of external actors
Foreign participants have special roles and responsibility in implementing
preventative measures. External actors should devote more resources towards
development and debt reduction programs that are fruitful in creating a positive
environment for demilitarization.

21

Chapter 3: Building Consensus

Building consensus is the first and most important step in the
demilitarization process. This process includes bringing the warring parties to the
negotiating table and working on a conflict resolution framework that will be
applied during the demilitarization process. It also gives the parties a platform
where their grievances and visions of the future can be considered. This stage
also entails the formulation of a time frame in which the agreed plan will be
completed. The main objective in the process of building consensus is to make
sure that all parties involved in the dispute are brought to the negotiating table.
Accurate identification of all players is important for the success of the
negotiation stage. The main players should include both articulate elites and the
less visible members of society. (Table 1, 2.)
The Arusha model states that during the demilitarization process it is
essential to build a level of political consensus between the parties involved and
that extensive dialogue must be held on national and regional levels. Dialogue
between the warring factions is essential in coming up with appropriate
mechanisms that will help facilitate the demilitarization process. Outside
institutions such as the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the Southern
African Development Community (SADC), the European Union and the United
Nations could provide appropriate platforms in the demilitarization process.
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Rwanda
One of the main challenges that Rwanda faced in its demilitarization process has
been getting the rebel groups to reach a consensus. The greatest challenge to
these talks has been the issue of disarmament. In the early stage of the
demilitarization process, government delegates in both countries initially rejected
a plan that included the simultaneous disarmament of all combatants. The
officials felt that disarmament would be disastrous hence they were reluctant to
cooperate. The building consensus stage was a challenge for Rwanda mainly
because of the fragmentation of the political system. Getting all the parties
involved in the conflict to come to the negotiating table has been a challenge
mostly because the rebel groups and the government have not been willing to
negotiate. Another obstacle in getting the rebel groups together has been the fact
that most of the rebel groups that are not participating in the negotiating stage
are working outside the country as militia groups.
The first step towards bringing the parties to the negotiating table was held
in Zaire on March 29th 1991. The main objective of the meeting was to establish
a cease-fire between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the government.
After a month of negotiations the two groups signed the N'se/e Ceasefire

Agreement. Part of the agreements of the cease-fire was the cessation of all
hostilities, withdrawal of all foreign troops and the exchange of the prisoners of
war. However nothing substantial came out of the peace agreement because the
government failed to implement most of the agreed terms, fighting continued
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among the two groups anclthis continuation of violence derailed the peace
process. 18
Another attempt to bring the warring parties to the negotiation table was
done in 1992. The cease-fire was held under the facilitation of the Organization
of African Unity (OAU). The meeting was held in Arusha Tanzania as an effort to
find a compromise that accommodated the demands of the parties involved. The
major players in the cease-fire process were the Habyarimana regime and the
Rwanda Patriotic Force (RPF). The facilitators in the demilitarization process
included former President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania and his Ambassador
Ami Mpungwe. The negotiation went on for a year before an agreement was
reached. The main objectives of the cease-fire were the creation of a democratic
government that upheld the rule of law and the creation of "broad based"
government of national unity. The parties involved agreed on the creation of a
national army that would be neutral and be reflective of all ethnic groups that
exist in Rwanda. Part of the peace agreement was a guarantee that all parties
would be represented in the legislature.
Another obstacle in building consensus in Rwanda was the level of
commitment the warring parties had towards the peace agreement. Both
Rwandan Patriotic Front and the government showed high level of reluctance in
implementing any of the agreed upon protocols. The level of leadership played a
major role in the success and failure of the negotiation stage in Rwanda. In the
first stage of the negotiation stage President Habyarimana was the main
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obstacle, he vetoed any breakthroughs in the negotiations that gave any
indications of relinquishing power from MOR (Republic Democratic Movement).

Parties involved in the Cease-fire: Rwanda
Table 1: Rwanda Peace Accords, 1993-2002

Date/Place: March 29, Zaire 1991
Events & Actors: The signing of the N'sele Ceasefire Agreement. The
government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwanda Patriotic Front
(RPF)

Contents: The government and the rebel groups agreed to the
demobilization process. Part of the agreement was the cessation of all
hostilities, withdrawal of all foreign troops and the exchange of prisoner of
war.

Date/Place: August 28, 1993 Arusha Tanzania
Events & Actors: Signing of a Ceasefire, by the Republic Democratic
Movement (MOR) and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)
Facilitator: President Ali Hassan Mwinyi and Ambassador Ami Mpungwe.

Contents: Both parties pledged to promote the security of Rwanda by
keeping the pledge to suspend their ammunition and weapons to the field.
The army has to be nationalized and reflective of the ethnic composition of
the population.
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Another challenge to the negotiation stage in Rwanda was on the issue of
the formation of a new national army, which included the integration of the two
forces to make one army. The rebel group did not trust the government to be
impartial in their selection of the new army. The agreement defined the mission,
size and structure of the army as well as the procedures for the assembly and
integration of the two forces into a National Army. The RPF would have 40% of
all troops and 50% of all commanding posts. The transitional government would
rule for a year. Parliamentary elections would be held at the end of the
transitional period in June 1993. The government position would be equally
distributed among the major parties. 19
The biggest blow to the negotiation stage in Rwanda was the death of
President Habyarimana in a plane crash that killed both him and Rwanda's
president Cyprien Ntaryamira. The two leaders had both been attending the
regional peace summit in Arusha. The plane crash was the first sign of discontent
with regards to the peace accords signed. It is believed that the rocket that
caused the crash was orchestrated by Hutu hardliners who did not like the
settlement that had been signed with RPF20 . The death of the main actor in the
peace process destabilized the demilitarization process because it enhanced the
level of mistrust between the warring groups. The death of President
Habyarimana became a turning point in the ceasefire. The army went on a killing
spree that left 800,000 people dead.
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Burundi

The first stage of building consensus was more successful in Burundi than in
Rwanda. However the negotiation stage was not without any challenges of its
own. Unlike the attitude that the leadership in Rwanda had, the leadership in
Burundi was more willing to work out an amicable conflict resolution plan that
would accommodate the rebel groups.
The death of President Cyprian Ntaryamira did not cause extreme
violence in Burundi. The reaction to the death was much milder and the country
went through political instability that involved only sporadic killing from extremist
groups. Though this instability posed to threaten the co-existence of the different
factions that existed in Burundi the fighting did not turn out to be genocidal.
These events clearly illustrate that the Rwandans and Burundians were not ready
yet for the demilitarization process because the peace accord was signed too
fast and too early thus the 1992 cease-fire accord became a complete failure. 21
The first sign of discontent with the 1992 peace accords in Burundi was
shown through the coup that was orchestrated by Tutsi Major Pierra Buyoya in
1993. The army obviously was not satisfied by the results of the conference
therefore they decided to take matter into their hands and seize power. This
incident indicates that military was not willing to take a back seat in the decision
making process.
After the failure of the peace accord, Burundi signed another peace
agreement with the CNDD-FDD (National Council for the Defense of DemocracyForces Defense of Democracy) in Rome 1997. These negotiations marked a
21
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turning point in the peace process in Burundi because it recognized more parties
into the peace process. The CNDD became the representative of the Hutu
fighting forces FRODEBU, PALIPEHUTU, FROLINA. The parties agreed to form
a constitutional government that would uphold its commitment for a true ceasefire. In June 1998 the National Assembly signed a document "Agreement on the
Political Program for the regime of transition".
In October 2002 the Burundi transitional government under President
Buyoya and the National Council for Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD)
represented by Pierre Nkurunziza entered into another ceasefire negotiations in
Arusha Tanzania. The rebels at first rejected all proposals because the leaders
were opposed to the timeline that had been set aside for them to sign the peace
accord and stated that "unfortunately we did not reach any understanding despite
three hours of discussion ... " (Therence Sinunguruza). 22 One of the groups that
was strongly opposed to the ceasefire was the FNL. The head of the facilitation
team, Deputy President Jacob Zuma met with the delegations of the Palipehutu
Forces for National Liberation (Palipehutu-FNL) led by Agathon Rwasa. The
rebel groups would not reach any consensus till the government agreed upon
terms which included the dismantling of all of its concentration camps, the official
recognition of the Palipehutu-FNL, the return of the Burundian government
soldiers to their barracks, the destruction and disarming of all pro-government
militias and finally the release of all political prisoners. After reviewing the

Burundi's foreign minister "Burundi Ceasefire talks end without progress< www.http.reilefweb> Dec
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requests, the facilitators stopped negotiations with the group. 23 Thus in the end,
the Forces of National Liberation (FNL) refused to sign the accord because they
felt that their demands were not considered. According to their spokesman Mr
Habimana, "The ceasefire accord signed by the FDD does not weaken us,
because we never cooperated with them, and we never depended in any way on
the FDD,"24 . Only three out of the four rebel groups in the end signed the 2002
peace accord.
The peace accord gave the rebel groups an opportunity to actively
participate in the new government. The Arusha agreement between Tutsi
dominated government and Hutu rebels defined a transitional government that
divided the governance of Burundi into two phases. According to the plan, the
two parties would participate in a one and a half year governance period within
the frameworks of a three-year transitional government. The Tutsi President
Pierre Buyoya would go first and then step down in May 2003 and allow for
President Domitian Ndayizeye to rule in the second phase. In May 1st 2003
President Buyoya stepped down and allowed for a successful transition.
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Another meeting to facilitate more talks and to provide an opportunity for
consensus was held in Switzerland. The meeting resulted in rebel leaders
signing the "Joint Declaration on the Demilitarization of Kisangani". 26 Part of the
agreement was that the governments of Burundi and Rwanda would work
towards the demilitarization of the region of Kisangani. Both parties would
23
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withdraw their forces that were deployed in and around the area. The rebel
groups27 agreed not to jeopardize the demilitarization process of the region.
However this truce was short lived as rebel groups have continued to fight one
another.
Parties involved in Cease-fire in Burundi
Table 2: Burundi Peace Accords, 1993-2002
Date/Place: August 28, 1993 Arusha Tanzania
Events & Actors: Signing of a Ceasefire between the government and
Frodebu, Uprona.

Facilitator: President Julius Nyerere.
Contents: Both parties pledged to promote the security of Burundi by
keeping the pledge to suspend their ammunition and weapons to the field.
The army has to be nationalized and reflective of the ethnic composition of
the population.
Date/Place: Arusha, Tanzania 2002
Events & Actors: The signing of the Arusha peace accord. The parties involved
include the CNDD-FDD (National Council for Defense of Democracy- Forces
Defense of Democracy) 28 and the government.

Facilitator: President Nelson Mandela (South Africa) and Vice President

Zuma (Tanzania)
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Rebel groups include The Front National de Liberation (FNL), Forces pour la Defense de la Democratic

(FDD).

The CNDD-FDD became the representative of the Hutu fighting forces of FRODEBU, P ALIPEHUTU,
FROLINA.
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Contents: The formation of a transitional government that divided the
governance of Burundi into two phases. This marked the transition to a
power-sharing government.
The leaders at the conference have stated that it is important to establish
some form of regional and sub-regional solidarity in the demilitarization process.
Burundi has had regional and sub-regional solidarity through mediators like
President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and President Nelson Mandela of South
Africa. Talks brokered by Mandela led to the establishment of a transitional
power sharing government that was backed by the South African peace-keeping
forces working under the United Nations. The African Union (AU) peacekeepers
have been stationed in Burundi as part of AU efforts to end the 9-year-old conflict
between the Tutsi led army and the Hutu rebel Militias. The building consensus
stage is a crucial part of the demilitarization process because if the warring
parties do not agree on a peace agreement that allows for the disarmament and
reintegration process of former rebel groups the demilitarization process
becomes a complete failure. The demilitarization process can only be a success
when the parties involved agree on the rules of engagement that would allow
them to air their grievances without resorting to violent means.
Events that have occurred in past indicate that both Rwanda and Burundi
have failed in the negotiating process and the fragility of the peace accord.
Consensus has not yet been reached in Burundi; in the past few weeks 29
thousands of people have fled Kanyosha Commune following heavy fighting,
between government officials and rebels that are loyal to Pierre Buyoya.
29
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"Fighting has continued in Burundi despite a largely disregarded ceasefire signed
in December 2002 by the main Hutu rebel group, the Forces for the Defense of
Democracy (FOO), and the government."30 • These attacks have been a violation
of the ceasefire agreement that the rebels signed with the government. The
attack indicates that the FOO (Forces for the Defense of Democracy) faction is
not satisfied with the agreements signed.
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Burundi is paying a large price for

not having included the FNL rebels groups on the negotiating table. The rebels
renewed their attack on Bujumbura leaving thousands of people fleeing for their
lives. The FNL group that was left out of the 2002 peace accord has re-emerged
causing civil unrest within the country. The FNL wants the new government to
negotiate with them on their own terms. This incident indicates that when
consensus is not reached by all parties involved in the conflict, the likelihood of
the demilitarization failing is high.
The numerous cease-fires that have been signed are an indication that the
negotiations are not going well. Though the rebel groups have been able to come
to the negotiating table they have not been able to live up to the agreements.
The lack of consensus has led to continued sporadic fighting between rebels and
government soldiers. One of the reasons behind the inconsistency in the
consensus has been due to the fact that the rebel groups and the government
have not bought into the peace process. The initiatives being offered have not
been good enough to convince them to give up their arms. The armed forces
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know what is at stake in giving up their arms and what it means to be in power
hence the parties all want to be actively involved in the government.
Conclusion

Burundi and Rwanda have failed in the first stage of the demilitarization process
mostly because they have not been able to bring all the parties involved in the
conflict to the negotiating table. Though Burundi's negotiation stage seems to
have been more successful due to the success they have had with their
transitional government. However the Burundian government made the mistake
of not including the radical FNL party in their power sharing government. Events
that have occurred on July 2003 indicate that the group has refused to be left out
of the new government and is demanding that the government negotiates with
them.
In the case of Rwanda the negotiation stage has been hindered by the fact
that not all the rebel groups came to the negotiating table because some of the
groups are working outside the country as militia groups. They are not willing to
make a compromise with the government. The main objective of the militia
groups working in Uganda is to eventually launch a coup that would place them
in power and oust the Kagame regime. Trying to get the opposition parties to
build consensus under the political and social condition that exist in Rwanda is
extremely difficult. Negotiations have taken place under extreme conditions
mostly because after the 1994 genocide, Rwanda was in complete economic,
political and social disruption.
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This failure to reach consensus has huge implications on the
demilitarization process. Without the warring parties agreeing to put their guns
down and their willingness to work towards more peaceful resolution to the
conflict, there will always be instability within the country. The failure in the first
stage has huge implications of the whole demilitarization process because it
determines the success rate for the rest of the demilitarization process.
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Chapter 4: Redefine the military's role
The delegates at the Arusha Conference agreed on the fact that the military
should be integrated into society and not be isolated from the decision making
process in order to ensure the sustainability of the demilitarization process. The
delegates stated that if the army does not feel included and is not at ease with
the changing tides it would likely sabotage the process.
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Redefining the role of the military is an essential part of the demilitarization
process because it marks the transition from the old government to the new. The
main objectives in the government military reforms that have occurred in Rwanda
and Burundi have been to establish a governmental structure that allows for
civilian rule. These reforms have included the re-education of the military, the
creation a professional army that is apolitical and the institutionalization of civilian
control over the government. It is important that the military understands the
importance of their new role within the government and in society.
Convincing the rebel groups to give up their arms and take a back seat in
the transition process in the midst of great uncertainty would prove to be difficult
for the government. The rebel groups have in the past used force and violence
as a way of getting their message across and also as a defense mechanism
against other rebel groups. During the civil wars political parties used the army as
a means of gaining political leverage. In both countries the political parties had
their own armed forces they used as militia to support their political goals.
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Burundi

The armed forces have played a crucial role in the establishment of a transitional
government. There have been active members in the peace accord dictating and
establishing the terms of engagement of the transitional government. The
incorporation of most of the rebel groups into the decision making process has
made the transition to a new national army easier, but not necessarily without
challenges. The government has taken great care in how they have
implemented the process of demobilization because of the issues it might trigger
which compromise security as well as the political and ethnic dimensions.
Military reforms were introduced in Burundi by the first democratically
elected President Melchior Ndadaye in 1993. His main objective was to disarm
the rebel groups; however none of the rebel group was willing to give up their
arms. Ndadaye's victory was viewed as a threat by the Tutsi army who saw his
rise in power as an end to their access to influence the economy, security and
decision making process. Part of the military reform that the President undertook
was the establishment of a power sharing transitional government that would
help him implement democratic principles that would eventually facilitate for a
civilian government. The army was opposed to the democratic transitional
process, for they felt that Ndadaye was sacrificing his own minority group by
establishing power sharing government with the Hutu's. The president had to
convince the army that they had to accept the electoral verdict and not go against
the will of the people. The protest by the army over the power-sharing process
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indicates that the army was not ready to give up their political power by allowing
a civilian government to be created.
President Ndadaye military reform included establishment of a neutral
recruitment policy of the army that emphasized communal recruitment in an effort
to make sure that all ethnic groups and regions would be integrated into the
army. The establishment of a neutral recruitment policy for the army was
essential in the creation of an apolitical army. However rebel groups such as
UPRONA refused integration. Instead they made it difficult for the transitional
government to govern in an effort to legitimize their coming back in power. In
October 21 1993, the army staged a coup that killed President Melchior
Ndadaye, Pontien Karibwami(President of National Assembly), Gilles
Bimazubute(Vice-President of the National Assembly) Juvenal Ndayikeza
(Minister of Territory Administration), Richard Ndikumwani (Security Chief of
Staff), Mrs Eusebia Ntibantunganya (spouse of the former foreign minister) and
four provincial governors. For the army, this was a clear attempt to end
democracy and bring back a dictatorship. These events later led to the
systematic killings of the Hutus by the army. 33 These events clearly show that the
army was not yet ready to take a back seat in the decision making process. Any
change in the army and government structure meant the effective end of their
political and economic power. The numerous coups that have occurred after the
death of the first democratically elected President indicate that the armed forces
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in Burundi might be having a hard time accepting a minor role in the decision
making process.
Under the current government of Buyoya since 1998-2003, the military still
has an upper hand in government decision-making. The President himself was a
former solider and still has close ties with the army commanders. The reason
why there has been continued fighting amidst peace talks is because the rebel
groups want equal representation in the new government. One of the main
concerns of the rebel's was that "sharing political power ... would be meaningless
while the army still was dominated by Tutsis."
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The rebels have been calling for

a new army that is reflective of the ethnic diversity that exists in Burundi.
President Buyoya, under pressure from the international community, has
tried to apply democratic principles to his government. The first concern that he
has addressed has been the reintegration of the army. The old army was
dismantled and a new army was created. The new army was made out of fifty
percent government officials and fifty percent Hutu rebels. Equal representation
has allowed for the creation of an army that is neutral in its ethnic composition. A
FAR commander heads the National Army while a RPA commander heads the
gendarmerie. The army reform has also lead to the establishment of joint
command in the army between the two commanders of the FDD and FNL. The
joint command in the army has allowed for a peaceful transition of the armed
forces.
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Rwanda
In Rwanda, military reform effort began during the cease-fire process. The
government agreed to integrate the rebel forces into the new national army. The
RPF would have a ratio of 40% of all troops and 50% of all commanding posts.
The government of Rwanda has taken great strides in the demobilization process
by creating the Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) to
implement the first stages of the demilitarization process. In 1996 Rwanda
began the demobilization process by incorporating approximately 15,000 ex-FAR
of the estimated 40,000 who returned to Rwanda from the Refugee camps into
the new army and by September of 1997 an estimated 8, 700 soldiers were
demobilized from the RPA.
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The government has currently reduced the army's size to 13,000 troops and
gendarmerie of 6,000 men. The government under Kagame has asked for
outside help to facilitate the reintegration process. The government requested
that a neutral international force be in charge. The UN Security Council approved
the deployment of 5,500 U.N Blue Helmets to provide security in the demilitarized
zones. However the first stage of the reintegration process was poorly
implemented because the government was not able to effectively reduce the
number of the APA troops they incorporated into the new army. Rwanda's
involvement also made the first successful effort in redefining the role of the
military because of its involvement in the DRC civil war. Donors became more
reluctant to finance the demilitarization process.
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The international community has played a major role in the demilitarization
process of both countries. The World Bank has offered its expertise and financial
support. The World Bank has established a Demilitarization and Reintegration
program. The World Bank was involved in the second stage of the reintegration
process. The main focus of the program was to help Rwanda in the social and
economic reintegration of its ex-combatants. The plan included the
demobilization of 20,000 RPA soldiers and the demobilization of an estimated
30,000 members of the armed forces returning for the DRC. The ex-combatants
that were demobilized in the first stage were also included in the second stage.
The World Bank played an important role in the demobilization process in
Rwanda because it brought with it a structured organization with well designed
goals that divided the demobilization and reintegration process into three phases
that would be implemented within a period of 12-18 months starting February
2002. The process included the transportation of the ex-combatants to
demobilization centers, the provision of RDRP identity card, medical screening
(HIV/AIDS counseling) and the orientation about civilian life and making the excombatants aware of the benefits available to them. The next stage of the
demobilization stage was the establishment of the Reinsertion program that
provided a transitional safety net (TSN). The purpose of the program was to
provide the ex-combatants with their basic needs such as rent, medical care and
food. The demobilization of Child Ex-Combatants involved the reunification of
families and the provision of trauma counseling and psychosocial care. Though
the demilitarization program was well structured, the government of Rwanda has
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struggled to make this process work. Continuous fighting and lack of trust among
the soldiers has made the redefinition of the military's role difficult. Most of the
ex-combatants who are being integrated into the new national army are not sure
that the members of the ruling government will not retaliate against them or over
look their role in the new government.
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Some progress has been made in the creation of an apolitical army. The
government of Rwanda has made sure that all ethnic groups are included in the
new national army removing the ethnic monopoly that had dominated the army
for many years. The coups that have occurred in the past have been an
indication that the military and the rebel groups have been accustomed to
participating in the decision-making policy.
Progress has been made in Rwanda in their effort to reeducate the excombatants. The government has established military-reeducation centers that
provide a range of programs, which include topics on human rights, and the
discussion of the new rules of engagements. Gako military base, which houses
Rwanda's former government army, offers a reeducation program. The program
has 2,000 officers and soldiers who will be integrated into the national army. The
main theme that the base is emphasizing is the new mission of the national army
whose primarily role will be to serve the country and its citizens at all times. The
re-doctrination of the army is essential for the transitional process to succeed and
according to Munyambo, "we try and teach then by showing them our behavior,
our military discipline, our military line."38 The Gako military base has been
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created by the government in an effort to establish a new doctrine within the
army that allows for the loyalty of the army to be towards the government and the
citizens of Rwanda.
Rwanda's effort to include former army leaders into parliament has not been
successful because some of the ministers have defected. Recent events indicate
that Brigadier General Emmanuel Habyarimana who was defense minister and
Lieutenant Colonel Balthazar Ndengenyika who was the army representative in
parliament were caught at the border of Uganda while heading to join rebel
groups .The two officials are accused of working with the Ugandan security
operatives in an effort to destabilize the country.
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These events indicate that the

road to peace is still long.
Conclusion
The neutrality of the army is highly questionable in both Rwanda and
Burundi mostly because the two countries are both being run by former rebel
leaders who have close links to the army. The redefining of the role of the military
is important because it would allow for the creation of an apolitical army whose
main role is to protect the country and the citizens. Government reforms
implemented by both countries have been essential in the transformation process
of the military regimes as they work towards establishing a civilian government.
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Chapter 5: Improve civil-military relations

One of the main points reinforced at the Conference was that networking and
dialogue between military representatives and civil society should be
encouraged. Adequate civilian supervision over the military should be given. The
demilitarization model states that Parliament must be given the capacity to
monitor and evaluate the function of the armed forces. There is need to create an
institutional format that allow for a civilian government to rule without
interruptions from the army.
The first challenge that the governments of Rwanda and Burundi have
faced in their effort to build healthy civil-military relations has been the issue of
trust. The civil wars and the legacy of genocide that has occurred within the
countries have left the civilian population scared. The wounds that exist between
the civilian and the armed forces are deep rooted; hence building a healthy civilmilitary relationship becomes an essential part of the demilitarization process.
The numerous cease-fires and failed peace accords have come at a high
price for the civilian population. The civilian are the ones who were raped,
brutally murdered and forced to move out of their homes and become refugees in
neighboring countries. All of this suffering was done by the hands of the army;
hence there is need for the army to convince the civilians that they have changed
and that they can be trusted.
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Burundi

Part of the demobilization process that has occurred in Burundi includes the
reintegration of the army into society. The social integration of the military was
encouraged as a way of reconciling ex-combatants and the civilian population.
The first step that the government has taken towards this goal has been the
sensitization of the army towards the needs of the population and also redefining
their role in the new political system. In Burundi, establishing a healthy civilmilitary relationship was less complicated because the wounds of mistrust and
betrayal were less complicated.
The civil wars that have occurred in Burundi in the past nine years have
created a great rift in the civil-military relations. The armed forces have played a
major role in the instability ph_ase because their coups have created
environments of insecurity that has left almost three hundred thousand civilians
dead. The civilian population has a negative view of the military because of the
psychology of militarism that they have been subjected to. Most citizens feel a
sense of insecurity.
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The first step towards improved relations was when the Burundian
government and the rebel groups signed the cease-fire accord in 1993. The
accord facilitated for the demilitarization of the armed forces and marked the
beginning of a peaceful resolution to the conflict that had claimed thousands of
civilian lives.
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Under the initiatives created by government programs that are focusing
on the reintegration of the army in society, the new Burundian army has been
working toward restoring trust among the civilian population. Recently the
Burundi army returned loot that had been stolen from Bujumbura by an army
battalion. The head of the battalion in which the group of looters came, assured
the public that investigation was underway to bring the culprits to justice. The
move was received with mixed feelings from people of Kamenge. Some civilians
felt that this incident helped restore some form of trust, while other saw it as an
example why the army should not be trusted.

41 Another

step towards improving

civil-military relations was the passing of the Genocide Law by parliament in
2002. The draft provides a grievance process for former victims and an
international judiciary that would look into inquires of crimes committed during the
genocide in Burundi.
The effort of re-establishing a healthy civil-military relation was facilitated
by the first democratic president Melchoir Ndadaye in 1993. However, his vision
of establishing a democratic government was sabotaged by the paratroopers,
who where instrumental in the killings of the President and half of his cabinet.
One mistake that Ndadaye made was to establish a multi-party system without
reforming the army first. During his term the army was 100% Tutsi. Another blow
to civil-military relations was by the death of President Habyarinman(Rwanda)
and President Cyprian Ntaryamira(Burundi) who were killed in a plane crash that
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occurred in October 16, 1993 . The relationship was strained because the two
incidents sparked ethnic violence that led to the genocide of Tutsi's in 1994.
Civil-military relations have improved in Burundi even amidst sporadic
fighting. The interim government has been able to maintain a peaceful
transitional process. On May 1st 2003, President Buyoya was able to step down
from his position without causing significant instability. The absence of a coup
attempt reflects well on the transitional government in Burundi. This could mark a
turning point in the demilitarization process because it indicates the potential of a
sustainable demilitarization process.

Rwanda
The process of improving civil-military relations has been difficult because
the remnants of the genocide that killed 800,000 people are still imminent in the
society. The genocide destroyed the social and cultural structure of Rwanda.
The gap between the civilians and the military is much wider in Rwanda because
of the genocide. The road to recovery seems far-fetched for most of the civilian
who are still waiting for the people who tortured them to go on trail. For most of
the citizens the question of improving civil-military relations has nothing to do with
accepting the ex-combatants back into their society, their main concern is
whether justice will be served.
Part of the healing process in civil-military relations of Rwanda has been the
bringing of former army members and rebel group leaders to justice. The
government has set up a national community courts that will try at least 100,000
suspects. The establishment of community courts (Gacaca) has been a positive
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step the government has taken towards acknowledging that civilians where the
main victims in the civil wars. This process will help strengthen national unity.
However the process has been slow and much criticism has been given by
Human Right organizations in regards to the Gacaca courts because the courts
are equipped with judges who do not have any legal training. 42 The President
however is optimistic about the importance of the courts in the establishment of
peace relations within society. He has stated that the success of the courts will
depend primarily on the participation of the people "reconciliatory justice will be
the basis for unity and the foundation for progress" (Kagame) 43 . The army
members have agreed to this process mostly because it gives them a lesser
sentence than they would normally get if tried in a regular court. In the Gacaca
courts the most they would get for their crimes is community service. The
acceptance of the Gacaca courts might be an indication of a new willingness on
the military to accept civilian control.
The nature of the courts themselves have been set in such a way that the
public actively participates in the justice process by giving testimonies and being
given a chance to forgive those who committed crimes against them. The
government hopes that the public confessions will help in the healing process as
victims attempt to discover the fate of their missing relatives. However the
reconciliation process is not fully accepted by all members in society because
some still feel that by letting the criminals go on a lesser charge justice will not
have been done. The ex-combatants also fear reprisal from the community. The
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only draw back of the Gacaca courts is that they do not give any form of
protections for the witnesses and the detainees who testify in public. There is no
guarantee whether the public after the confession will not take matters into their
own hands and retaliate against the former prisoner. The government has also
been accused of setting a double standard in their tribunals because they have
been reluctant to bring many of its own people to justice. There is need for
members of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (APA) who committed crimes to be
brought to court. Instead the government has insisted that the tribunal should
only try genocide cases. 44 The Gacaca courts are part of the peace and
reconciliation process facilitated by the government. The courts contribute to the
demilitarization process because the key concepts of the reconciliation process
contribute to the improvement of healthy civil-military relations.
Despite the government's reluctance in giving up their own members to the
tribunal, some top officials have been brought to trail. The recent arrest of the
man who headed the Rwandan armed forces during the genocide, Augustin
Bizimungu, has been welcomed by the citizens. Augustin Bizimungu has been
sent to the International Criminal court in Tanzania Arusha were he awaits trail.
The bringing to trial of top government officials during the demilitarization process
indicates a reform process within the government and military. There no longer is
immunity for military officials.
Some progress has been made to re-educate ex-combatant before sending
them back to their communities. The establishment of a multi-party system has
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provided the population the right to be affiliated with any political party. However
the government has still retained an upper hand on most of its opposition parties.
On June 23rd, the National Assembly adopted an organic law that prohibits
political parties to be affiliated to one ethnic group, tribe, clan, region and religion.
Political parties are supposed to reflect the unity of the Rwandan people45 • This
new amendment has received great support from the civilians. The population
came out in large amounts to make their opinion known; the new constitution was
passed by 93% of voting electorate46 • The constitution is designed to prevent
genocide. The framework of the new referendum safeguards against the
dominance of a single political party and bans the enticement of ethnic hatred.
The outpour for the elections indicates that "the constitution has been prepared
by Rwandans themselves" (Karangwa). The new constitution stipulates that no
party can hold more than 50% of seats in cabinet even if they secure an absolute
majority in parliamentary. 47 The new laws provides that the President, the Prime
minister and President of the lower house cannot all belong to the same party
and includes a new provision outlawing the incitement of ethnic hatred. This
balance of power helps protect the civilians from ethnic monopoly that has
existed within the party system. However the recent governmental crack down on
political parties just before the August elections has led the human right
organizations to suspect that the current government is intimidating any potential
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rivalry. Rwanda prepares to hold it first elections in August 2003. This will be the
first election held since the 1994 genocide that killed 800,000 people. 48
The constitution of Rwanda has been amended to reflect the new goal of
"national unity''. The constitution had made a clear statement that the rule of law
and civilian life shall be at the heart of the nation. The first article in the
constitution stipulates that Rwanda shall be a democratic state that will be
governed for the people and by the people. Power has been transferred from the
military to the civilian government, article 6 in the constitution stipulates that all
powers shall come from the state and the national sovereignty shall belong to the
people of Rwanda. Article 12 stipulates that public liberty and human life shall be
inviolable no one may be prosecuted arrested. All citizens are equal and shall not
be discriminated against. Finally the constitution has given the executive powers
to the President of the Republic and he shall be assisted by the government,
composed of the prime minister and minister of state. The constitution reflects a
positive civil-military relation that places the civilian government above the
military.

Conclusion
Much progress has been made by both Rwanda and Burundi in their effort
to improve the civil-military relationship. The governments have been able to
identify the negative image the society has towards the military. The government
reforms that have included the re-education programs in Rwanda have been
instrumental in the rehabilitation process of the ex-combatants. In Burundi the
48
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successful implementation of the transitional government helped stabilize the
country and thus creating an environment conducive for reconciliation between
the military and civilian population. Though the governments have done their best
to implement reforms that reflect their commitment towards healthy civil-military
relationship the sporadic killings and the insecurity still present within these
countries takes the process of improving civil-military relations a step backwards.
The success of the Improve civil-military relations stage in the demilitarization
process is essential because it creates an atmosphere of cooperation between
the two groups. The success of the reintegration process of the army into society
heavily depends of the relationship that exists between the army and the civilian
population.
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Chapter 6: The role of external actors
The delegates at the Arusha Conference maintain that foreign participants have
a special role in helping to maintain stability during the demilitarization process.
External actors should devote more resources towards development and debt
reduction programs that are fruitful in creating a positive environment for
demilitarization process.
Much criticism has been directed towards the lack of interest that the
international community has demonstrated towards the civil wars in Africa. The
United Nations has received most of the criticism because of its ineffectiveness
in both Rwanda and Burundi during the genocide period of 1994. As stated by
the delegates at the Arusha Conference the role of the international community
cannot be over looked in the conflict resolution process because they bring with
them mediation expertise and financial resources that are essential to the
success of the demilitarization process. External actors have been present in
Burundi and Rwanda during the pre-genocidal stage (1993) and the post
genocide phase (1994-2003) of the conflict. The external organizations that have
participated in the peace process have included the United Nations, NonGovernmental Organizations (NGO's) and religious affiliated organizations. All of
these groups have contributed either in the mediation and implementation stage
or have been active in providing humanitarian assistance.
Regional leaders have played a very important role as mediators between
the rebels and the government. Their role has been crucial because most of the
facilitators have been highly respectable and influential leaders in the African
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community. The local actors who participated in the negotiation stage and the
implementation stage brought to the table regional expertise crucial in facilitating
dialogue. The first Arusha conference that occurred in 1992-1993 was held in
Tanzania through the initiative of the then President Ali Hassan Mwinyi. Other
regional leaders that have participated in the peace process have been former
South African President Nelson Mandela whose intensive efforts led to the
signing of a Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Arusha. Another regional
actor that has played an active role in the negotiation stages ( 1996-1998) was
the former president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere.
External actors have been the driving forces behind secret talks that have
been held in Switzerland and Tanzania between rebel groups. The presence of
external help has been instrumental in the facilitation of a peaceful transition of
power. The international community has also brought with it resources that have
been influential in the demilitarization process, such as the World Bank which
has funded most of the demobilization and integration programs in Rwanda and
Burundi.

Burundi
In the case of Burundi, the role of external actors has been essential in the
establishment of neutrality in the region. External actors have managed to
establish preventive methods that have helped in the demilitarization process
such as the presence of the UN special representative Quid -Abdallah in Burundi
helped maintain stability in the shadow of genocide. The UN's role during this
time period was to "warn the Burundian leaders of the possibility of an explosion
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like that in Rwanda ... needed to give them hope by convincing them that a
political settlement was possible"49
The Organization of African Union (OAU) has been an active participant in
Burundi. The OAU sent its representative Ambassador Papa Louis Fall of
Senegal to negotiate with the government of Burundi on the issue of placing 500
African soldiers in place before the end of December 1993. However because of
protest by the Tutsi's who opposed the idea of sending uniformed men into the
region, the OAU ended up sending military observers who where civilians. The
OAU, however, was unable to deploy the seventy observers in the agreed
timeframe. In the end only eighteen observers out of the seventy requested were
dispatched by February 1994. The OAU mission group was however expanded
to twelve civilians and seventy military officers by 1995 and its new head became
Leandra Bassole of Burkina Faso.
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The United Nations also played an important role. Its main mission in
Burundi was to restore the democratic institutions that had broken down after the
death of President Ndadaye. The U.N wanted to facilitate dialogue between the
opposing parties and work closely with Organization of African Union (OAU). In
1993 the UN sent Quid Adallah as its special representative to Burundi. The UN
special representative worked closely with local leaders and the OAU in an effort
to exchange vital information that allowed the U.N to facilitate dialogue between
the parties. The presence of the UN representative helped stabilize a conflict that

49

Ould-Abdallah, Burundi on the Brink 1993-95 (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press
2000. pp. 60-64
50 Ould-Abdallah, Burundi on the Brink 1993-95 (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press
2000.

54

could have easily escalated into genocide. The United Nations has been the
main facilitator in most of the peace accords that have been signed. During the
1994 cease-fire process a neutral international force (U.N Blue Helmet) was sent
to the demilitarization zones in Burundi to help implement security measures.
Rwanda
Following the signing of the Arusha agreement in 1993 between the
Rwandan government and the RPA, the U.N established a peacekeeping task
force known as UN Mission to Rwanda (UNMAIR). The main function of the
UNMAIR was to observe the cease-fire process and the implementation of the
agreements. However the UNMAIR was unable to monitor all the development
that led to the genocide. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
was responsible for hosting the round table conference that discussed the
rehabilitation of the area affected by the warring in April 1994.The UN has also
been active in the tribunal courts that have been established to try genocide
crime. The current head of the UN war tribunals is chief prosecutor Carla del
Ponte. 51 The United Nations (U.N) under the leadership of Boutros-Ghali has
been criticized for not playing a decisive role during the genocidal period the
occurred in Rwanda. However its role after the genocide until the present has
been essential in stabilizing the political situation in the two countries. The OAU
was also present in the conflict resolution process in Rwanda, the organization
was actively involved in the peace-making settlements in Rwanda that led to the
Arusha Agreement in 1993.
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The huge influx of refugees returning home has called for the urgent need
for humanitarian agencies to participate in the peace process. Non-governmental
organizations have played an essential role in the demilitarization process by
providing humanitarian assistance that has been essential in the stabilization
period. Humanitarian aid is important in the demilitarization process because it
helps take care of the immediate needs of the ex-combatants and the civilian
population. 52

Individual Governments contribution to the demilitarization process
Individual governments have played an important role in the
demilitarization process by providing Burundi and Rwanda with enough monetary
funds to implement the demilitarization process. The French government, prior to
the genocide, had given support to the Rwandese government and army. French
intervention was greatly welcomed by the interim government in Rwanda but
highly opposed by the rebel groups who saw the French as being biased towards
the government. In 1994 due to public pressure the French government sent in
2,200 soldiers to Goma and Bukava in Zaire. The French assisted the RAF by
training their army. Though the troops came late, they where able to save an
estimated of 12-15000 Tutsi's and helped to provide food relief to the refugees.
The French finally left in August and their mission was replaced by UN Ethiopian
troops.
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One of the main actors in the demilitarization process has been the
Belgium government because of its close ties with Rwanda and Burundi. The
Belgium government has donated one million (US) dollars in the past year to
both governments. The Belgians played a major role during the Arusha process
they sent troops to UNAMIR. However their effort to help was disrupted when 1o
Belgian soldiers where massacred in Burundi, due to public outcry the Belgians
had to withdraw their troops.
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The United States, during the first stage of the peace process was
reluctant to send any troops into Rwanda because of its prior experience in
Somalia. Hence they did not support the resolution that was being pushed by the
French to send troops to Rwanda. However, in recent years because of public
criticism towards the government's reaction to the crisis in Africa more initiatives
have been made. President Clinton endorsed the UN Mission to Rwanda
(UNAMIR). The UN "blue helmet" arrived in Rwanda later in October of 1993 with
troops from Belgium, Canada, Ghana, Bangladesh and Tunisia. Rebel forces
insisted that the French troops should not be part of the troops because in the
past there have not been seen as a neutral force, but were viewed as having
sided with the government of Rwanda.
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The European Union has played an active role in the conflict resolution
process in Burundi and Rwanda. The signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement in
August 2000 brought a new era of cooperation between Burundi and the donor
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community in Europe. At the conference at the Paris Don conference in
December 2000, mostly the European Commission (EC) and EU member states
pledged 40 million. The European Union decided on March 4th 2003 to contribute
to the establishment of an African Union cease-fire observer's mission in
Burundi. The grant is estimated to be 1.23 million (Euro) 56 . The mission will
monitor the implementation of the cease-fire agreement signed in December
2002 between the government and the rebel groups. The European Union has
also set up the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and
rehabilitation programme (PREBU) in Rwanda and has pledged 15 million
towards humanitarian aid programmes that would benefit 2 million people.
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The International community has played a crucial role in the
demilitarization and conflict resolution process in Burundi and Rwanda. They
have been able to make a strong statement of their vision of establishing
democratic principles in Burundi and Rwanda. The external actors have also
been able to contribute financially towards the demilitarization process. The
demilitarization process has so far been a costly process; millions of dollars have
been spent in the humanitarian and social integration programs.

Conclusion
The presence of the international community in the above countries has had
mixed blessings. It is clear that the international community was caught off guard
when the genocide of 1994 occurred in Burundi and Rwanda. None of the
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organizations understood the depth and disruptive nature of the conflict; hence
they were not able to prevent the genocide. The role and the credibility of the
United Nations was shaken because of its inactivity in Rwanda. Though the "blue
helmets" were deployed earlier they had no infrastructure in the country to
sustain the force deployed, hence their presence in the two countries became a
token. Another mistake that the United Nations made in their role in Rwanda and
Burundi was that they played an impartial role to the extent that they did not
criticize the interim government in an effort not to destabilize the fragile peace
process. The rebel groups saw this move as a sign that the UN was down player
the fact that the massacres that had occurred in Rwanda was done in the hands
of the government.
Later the international community tried to over compensate for their
inactivity in Rwanda by sending too many organizations to Burundi. An estimated
eighty NGO's were operating in Burundi in 1994. Most of them did not seem to
have a clear vision of the nature of the conflict and what was required to help.
The NGO's are also criticized for bringing a "dogmatic and academic approach to
the crisis."58 Most of the organization failed to realize that the nature of the
conflict required a different approach than they had used in conflict resolution.
The process of demilitarization has proven to be expensive and long and
requires full commitment from all parties involved. The international community
and the participating NGO's in Rwanda in the beginning of the conflict in Burundi
and Rwanda did not fully commit themselves. As soon as the conflict in Rwanda
Ould-Abdallah, Burundi on the Brink 1993-95 (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press
2000.) 32-37
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escalated in 1994 the international community pulled out leaving the civilians
under the mercy of the brutal armed forces. The United Nations pulled out its
staff in 1999 after two of its senior official were murdered by Hutu extremist in
Burundi, because of this incident all operation were suspended. The Belgium
government also pulled out after three of its personal where killed.
Though the international community has had mixed results their role cannot
be over looked in the overall picture of conflict resolution in Burundi and Rwanda.
The international community has learned from its mistakes and has made
necessary adjustment to make their presence in the two regions be as effective
as possible. They are now working in collaboration with the government in order
to better serve the communities that they are working in. The financial resources
that the international agencies bring will help establish sustainable development
that will enhance the stability of Burundi and Rwanda.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
My evaluation of the success and failure of the demilitarization process will
be based on how successfully Rwanda and Burundi implemented the first and
crucial stage in the demilitarization process, which is the stage that involves
building consensus between the warring parties. I will also analyze whether the
main interests of the parties were addressed, the obstacles encountered and
factors that led to progress, alternatives and missed opportunities and lessons
which could be learned, from the process.
My research indicates that the demilitarization process in Rwanda and
Burundi has been met with challenges. Despite the numerous peace accords that
have been signed in both countries, the resolutions of the accords have not been
implemented in full and to date the demilitarization process has not been fully
achieved. The demobilization of the militant groups has been partially
implemented in the above states although dissident groups are still operating
from neighboring states as guerrillas. Security issues still remain a grave
concern for the governments.
One of the main objectives of the Arusha model was to formulate a
demilitarization process that would help implement a sustainable conflict
resolution model that would bring about stability and peace in Africa. The results
of the model indicate that peace and stability have not yet been fully achieved in
both countries; security still remains of grave concern in both countries.
Burundi and Rwanda failed to successfully implement the first stage of the
demilitarization process. The stage includes the negotiations that allowed for the
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opposing groups to reach some form of consensus that both parties can agree
on. Both countries have struggled in the first stage of the demilitarization process
of building consensus. The lack of trust among the rebel groups has been the
biggest obstacle in the building consensus stage.
In the case of Rwanda both the government and the rebel groups did not
trust each other enough to accept the terms of the peace accords signed. They
came to the negotiating table to give lip service and never appeared to truly
support the agreements. President Habyarimana vetoed any breakthroughs,
indicating he was not willing to compromise. Lack of commitment towards
building consensus was also reflected in Burundi. President Buyoya only came
to the negotiating table because of international pressure that had imposed
sanctions on his government. These two incidents indicate that the first stage in
the demilitarization process lacked the essential ingredient that would determine
the success of the talks. The lack of commitment in the first initial stage to bring
about a peaceful resolution to the conflict proved to be detrimental to the whole
demilitarization process.
Regional instability within the boarders of Rwanda and Burundi has
contributed to the failure of the demilitarization process. Rwanda has to deal with
militia groups working within the boarders of Democratic Republic of Congo,
while Burundi has had to deal with opposition groups working in Uganda.
The demilitarization process has been complex in both countries, primarily
because of the nature of the conflict that has caused the civil wars. The conflicts
have been characterized by ethnic overtones and the struggle for political power.
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The political atmosphere that exists in the two countries has been a challenge in
the demilitarization process. There is lack of trust between the parties involved

'
and the rebel groups have not been ready to give up their arms out of fear of
being put at a disadvantage. The application of the model concludes that in order
for the demilitarization process to be a success, all the parties involved need to
share the same goals and be sincere in their effort to bring about a peace.
The outcome of the model when applied to Burundi and Rwanda indicate
that there are some concepts that are included in the model which are hard to
establish. The results of the demilitarization process have been affected by the
political structure of the countries. The results indicate that Burundi has a greater
chance in a sustainable demilitarization process because the major civil war of
1994 occurred when the country had already established some form of political
structure through the help of the United Nations; hence the country had a back
up government when President Cyprian Ntaryamira died in a plane crash.
Rwanda, unlike Burundi, went through a genocidal period that destroyed its
social and cultural structure hence the road to recovery is more of a challenge.
The nature of leadership in Burundi and Rwanda has made a difference in
the results of the demilitarization process. The transitional process has been a
greater success in Burundi because of the willingness of President Buyoya to
compromise and work towards a peaceful resolution with the rebel groups.
President Buyoya was willing to participate in the transitional government that
allowed him to step down in May 2003 and allowed President Domitian
Ndayizeye to rule in the second phase. On May 1st President Buyoya stepped
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down and allowed for a smooth transition of power. Rwanda on the other hand
lacked committed leadership; President Habyarimana, under political pressure
from his party, was unable to compromise on any deal that relinquished power
from his party MOR (Republic Democratic Movement). The main rebel group, the
RPF was more willing, to compromise and willing to accept a peaceful resolution.
Efforts to establish an effective demilitarization process in Rwanda have also
been marred by Rwanda's intervention in the civil wars in neighboring
Democratic Republic of Congo.
Redefining the role of the military has been a greater success in Burundi
in the sense that it has helped establish a more diplomatic relationship between
the rebel groups. There has been no coup attempt since the establishment of the
transitional government. The government has also been successful in integrating
former rebel group leaders into the new government. However recent events
that have occurred within the government sent warning signs that the military
might not have settled for the back seat. The case of Rwanda is unique in the
sense that the current government came into power through a military coup that
sent the former government into exile. The rebels won power; hence convincing
the army to play a neutral rule, has been more difficult. The current government
has been accused of protecting its own people from the rule of law. Unlike
Burundi, the Rwandan government has not gone through a power sharing
process. The biggest challenge to the current regime will be the up coming
elections.
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Improved civil-military relation has been a gradual process in both
Rwanda and Burundi because of the amount of work that needs to be done in
order to repair the psychology and emotional damage that was done during the
genocide period. It is too early to tell the nature of the civil-military relations
because of the continued fighting that has been occurring for the past few
months.
Of all the four aspects of the model, security threats remain the biggest
and the most unresolved issue in Burundi and Rwanda. The numerous curfews
that exist in Burundi portray a gloomy picture. The government has failed to
provide economic and political security for its population. Rwanda still faces the
threat of rebel groups that are still roaming around the refugee camps. Most of
the rebel groups are in the neighboring country of Congo. Rwanda has the
challenge of almost 20,000 soldiers of the former government that remain in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. The rebels might be tempted to form a guerrilla
army.
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These rebel groups have the potential to destabilize the demilitarization

process.
The most successful aspect of the Arusha model so far has been the role
that external factors have played in facilitating a peaceful transition to the
democratic process in Burundi. The international community has been able to
provide the manpower and monetary resources that have created a more
peaceful environment despite their failed attempts earlier in the conflict resolution
process. However their role at times has had mixed blessings, external actors
----~

have been criticized for their inaction in the beginning of the genocide that
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occurred in Rwanda and Burundi. They also failed to protect refugees from being
victimized by militia groups working within the camps.
The lessons leant in the demilitarization of Burundi and Rwanda is that
positive change in civil-military relationship can only come when the armed
forces themselves have decided to work towards a positive change. They are the
one who can aid a successful democratic transition process that would work for
their own country. One of the good aspects of the conflict resolution process has
been the participation of regional leaders. The presence of respectable African
leaders and the Organization of African Union indicates that the regional leaders
are concerned about the stability and sustainability of the peace process in
Rwanda and Burundi.
The model however fails to acknowledge the role of the media. In both
Rwanda and Burundi, the media was used as a propaganda tool by both the
rebel groups and the government. Radio played a major role to provoke genocide
in Rwanda. The "hate radio" such as Radio Tele Libre Mille Collines was used as
a vehicle for anti-Tutsi propaganda. They have been responsible for fomenting
ethnic hatred. 60 Most of the stations have fervently opposed the peace accords.
The role of the media should also be addressed in the demilitarization process
because of its potential in destabilizing the country. The media should be
encouraged to be apolitical and neutral in its reporting.
The models emphasis that regional leaders should be part of the
demilitarization process can have negative ramification when the regional leaders
have self invested interest on the outcome of the peace process. This can be
60
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seen by the support that DRC and Uganda have given to rebel groups in an effort
to destabilize the peace process in Rwanda and Burundi.
The main lesson to be learnt in the testing of the Arusha model is that in
order for demilitarization to be a success, the parties involved should all share
the same goal, which is to bring stability and peace into their country. Without
building consensus the process will keep on coming back to the negotiating table
till all parties are satisfied that they will be included into the decision making
process. The international Community has learned the importance of having
coherent and consistent plans in order to effectively make a difference in the
peace process.
The demilitarization of Burundi and Rwanda contributes to be an important
research topic because of their long history with civil wars and the instabilities
that have been brought in the Great Lake regions. The two countries are also
reflective of most of the regimes that exist in Africa where the governments are
going through the transitions to democracy from authoritarian regimes. The topic
of demilitarization is very relevant in Africa because the African continent has
been characterized by military coups in almost two-thirds of its states, which
gained independence after colonial rule. The revolutions that allow for regime
change have been lead mostly by guerrilla warfare, therefore when
independence is gained, there is need for the armed forces to put their guns
down and work toward a democratic transition. Demilitarization of the army is
important because it encourages healthy civil-military relations and encourages
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military transparency that allows the transparent civilian audit of the military
spending.
The analysis of the four aspects of the model provided a better
understanding of the complexities that surround transitions in civil-military
relations. One limitation that the model remains that it does not reflect the need
for a clear conceptual and theoretical understanding of the root causes of a given
conflict. The model also neglects to highlight the importance of empowering of
local actors so that they become the primary architects of the peace process.
The fact that the demilitarization process in Rwanda and Burundi has not
been successful does not invalidate the significance and the applicability of the
model in other countries that are going through the demilitarization process.
Rwanda and Burundi stand out as unique cases mostly because of the nature of
the conflict that has occurred. Both countries stand out as being the most
extreme cases of ethnic cleansing. The genocide has been responsible for the
death of an estimated 1.2 million people combined hence the reconciliation and
peace process has been difficult to implement. The mistrust and insecurity that
the genocide has caused makes it hard to create an environment that would
allow for former warring parties to reach an amicable peace process.
Contribution to Research
Earlier research on demilitarization has emphasized the importance of setting
realistic time frames when implementing the demilitarization programs. My thesis
is similar to past research material on demilitarization because it focuses on a
case study of two countries and also does a follow up process on the
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demilitarization process. The thesis has also highlighted some of the findings that
past research have argued that the process of demilitarization is a slow and
ambiguous process in the beginning. The results of Arusha model indicate that
Rwanda and Burundi have a long way to go before results can be seen. My
thesis supplements on earlier research by concentrating on the role that external
actor's have played in the demilitarization process.
Because of the limited research material available on the demilitarization
process of Rwanda and Burundi my thesis contributes significantly to the
research material on the topic of demilitarization in Africa. The thesis provides up
to date research material on the conflict resolution process of the above
countries. In Summary the demilitarization process has been examined from
many different perspectives but no recent work has examined the applicability of
the Arusha demilitarization model.
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